So Moore tried a new tactic: She recorded her conversations with her student, and then asked him to transcribe his own words—without worrying about grammar or punctuation. Once the student saw evidence in the transcripts for his capacity for unique ideas and analysis, his intellectual pride grew, and Moore could leverage it to teach him grammar and composition.
But they are just not on our schedule; it has nothing to do with their innate potential or ability. American public schools are going through a consequential transformation: The majority of Baby Boomer teaching veterans—who just over 15 years ago constituted more than half of the teaching force—have retired or will retire in the next few years.
The 15 teachers I got to know closely—from rural Oklahoma to Mississippi, subarctic Alaska to suburban Arizona, California, Texas, Kentucky, and Michigan—told me that effective teaching depends on paying attention to students as individuals, addressing their needs with cultural sensitivity, and seeking the active support of peers. But they also told me that their capacity to teach successfully has been weakened by misguided, top-down policies, chronic funding cuts to public education, and growing structural inequities.
To do their jobs fully, they said, they need basic resources—and they should be viewed as experts on what their students need. L ike all of the teachers I interviewed, Moore made a practice of seeking feedback from her students.
The students also talked about teachers who never bothered to learn how to pronounce their names correctly, or gave bad grades without properly explaining why. As a teacher at Mission High School in San Francisco where she now serves as principal , McKamey used her commute home each day to replay her observations of students.
She noted, for example, any body language that might indicate disengagement, like expressionless faces, or heads on desks. She also measured signs of engagement, such as a spontaneous discussion about an assignment or a student going beyond her requirements. The next morning, McKamey would get up at 5 a. These twin processes—developing relationships with students and reflecting on practice—are most essential to good teaching, according to the educators I spoke with.
Best for Large Rooms. Duration Home. What is the most expensive interior paint? What is the best paint finish for walls? A: Flat, eggshell and satin paint are best for interior walls, whereas semi-gloss and gloss paint are best for trim and woodwork. My personal preference may fall to flat paint because I like the look, but most people are quite happy with eggshell paint, which has a soft glow to it where the light hits.
Is Leyland Paint good? Leyland paint is good for new plaster and ceilings. Which car manufacturer has the best paint quality? I have seen the paint job varies from car to car within the same manufacturer. My guess is higher the cost of the car , one would expect better paint quality. These guys seem to really know what color look good on their cars. Is Sherwin Williams paint at Lowes the same? It's the same paint! Now, if Lowes as asked in the question is selling a Lowes Branded Private Label paint manufactured by Sherwin - Williams , then the paint is most likely different in chemical composition than the comparable Sherwin - Williams branded product.
Why is Benjamin Moore paint better? It looked horrible and I had to run out and buy Sherwin-Williams paint to do the walls which turned out great. I had to pay extra to have them paint the ceiling and the trim again. I went to the store and let them know that there were issues with the paint and that I wanted my money back.
They said the paint seemed fine and they could send it to be analyzed but only if I didn't post any bad reviews. Clearly they don't care about the quality of their paint if they will only send it for analysis if someone doesn't post a bad review.
I will never again use this paint. This paint covers nearly all of the flaws on surfaces. It rolls on smoothly and easily. It's worth the extra cost and comes in many colors. I recently painted over a damaged surface with a Benjamin Moore light pastel over old dark red paint. It only took a few coats and now the walls look almost professionally done even though I'm an amateur. I highly recommend this paint. I think Benjamin Moore paint is one of the best around if not the best.
I got my whole family using Benjamin Moore paint. I love them. I am about to redo my house within the next 2 or 3 weeks. Great paint with good coverage.
I've used it before on many interiors and exteriors and never had an issue. Excellent choice for all your painting needs. Very easy to use when brushing, rolling or spraying, easy clean up too! A premium paint brand that manufactures its own resins and proprietary colorants for a unique, long-lasting product.
It has always sold its paints through authorized independent retailers. But Moore thought it intuitively compelling that the pain is worse; if that makes the theory of value less systematic, so much the worse for system. But Moore never saw any intrinsic value in achievement, for example in business or politics, or indeed in any active changing of the world. The first of these goods was the appreciation of beauty, which for Moore combined the cognition of beautiful qualities with an appropriately positive emotion toward them, such as enjoyment or admiration.
We listen to music, for example, hear beautiful qualities in it, and are pleased by or admire those qualities.
But the value here is entirely contemplative; Moore saw no separate worth in what the romantics had especially valued, the active creation of beauty. Beauty too, then, was not a distinct normative concept but analyzable in terms of goodness. He did not notice, however, that this definition seems again to open him to an open-question argument, since it reduces the claim that it is good to contemplate beauty to the near-tautology that it is good to contemplate what it is good to contemplate.
Though Moore in Principia Ethica thought beauty good in itself, he did not insist on this view when valuing the appreciation of beauty; the latter might be good even if the former was not. But he still thought the existence of beauty makes a significant difference to value.
More specifically, he thought the admiring contemplation of beauty that actually exists and causes your contemplation is significantly better than an otherwise similar contemplation of merely imagined beauty, and better by more than can be attributed to the existence of the beauty on its own. This principle had been accepted by Idealists such as Bradley, who gave it a characteristically anti-theoretical formulation. They held that if x and y combine to form the whole x-R-y , their values, like their very identities, are dissolved in that larger whole, whose value cannot be computed from the values of its parts.
This view implies that when x and y enter into the relation R that constitute the whole x-R-y , their own values cannot be changed by those relations. Any additional value in the whole x-R-y must therefore be attributed to it as an entity distinct from its parts, and with the relations between those parts internal to it. The value of the whole is therefore not equal to the sum of the values of its parts, but is equal to a sum of which those values are constituents. But the two formulations locate the additional value in different places, and sometimes one and sometimes the other gives what seems the intuitively better explanation of an organic value Hurka Moore, however, was forced by his strict view of intrinsic goodness to use only the holistic formulation.
In the aesthetic case, he held that the admiring contemplation of beauty considered apart from the existence of its object always has the same moderate value a , while the existence of beauty always has the same minimal value b.
But when the two are combined so a person admiringly contemplates beauty that exists and causes his contemplation, the resulting whole has the significant additional value c as a whole. The existence of the beauty is therefore necessary for the significant value c , but that value is not intrinsic to it, belonging instead to the larger whole of which it is part.
Sidgwick had claimed that there would be no value in a world without consciousness and, more specifically, pleasure, and had concluded that pleasure must therefore be the only good , — And of course this was precisely his later view. Another application of the principle was in explicating claims about desert. The alternative variability view must say that when a person is vicious, his suffering pain switches from being purely bad to being purely good. In so characterizing love Moore was applying one of four recursive principles he used to generate higher-level intrinsic goods and evils from an initial base-set of goods and evils.
The principles were by no means unique to him; they had been defended earlier by Rashdall and Brentano and would be defended later by Ross. Rashdall and Ross called the higher-level values they generated virtues and vices, as it is indeed plausible to do; surely benevolence and compassion are virtuous and sadism vicious. Rashdall and especially Ross also held that virtue is the greatest intrinsic good and vice the greatest evil.
One did not do anything for or with a loved one; one simply admired her. Though he presented personal love as an additional good to aesthetic appreciation, he characterized it in an essentially aesthetic way. Moreover, his list of the goods one is to appreciate or comment in a loved one was also truncated.
It did not include pleasure or happiness, since that was not a significant good, nor even knowledge or achievement. This meant his account had no room for the special attachment to or heightened concern for an individual that many take to be central to personal love.
This is at odds with the loyalty, or attachment to individuals, that many think essential to love. But Moore was prevented from giving this account by other features of his view, such as his general emphasis on contemplative forms of love, his restricted list of initial goods, and his strict impartialism about value.
Outside philosophy one influence was through the literary and artistic figures in the Bloomsbury Group, such as Keynes, Lytton Strachey, and Leonard and Virginia Woolf, several of whom had come to know Moore while members with him of the Apostles. They were most impressed by the last chapter of Principia Ethica , whose identification of aesthetic appreciation and personal love as the highest goods very much fit their predilections.
But according to Keynes though Leonard Woolf —49 disagreed , they tended to ignore the impartial consequentialism within which he embedded those goods, concentrating on pursuing them just within their own lives rather than encouraging their wider spread in society. The novels of E. Forster, another Cambridge Apostle, contain several figures representing Moorean ideas, for example the Schlegel sisters in Howards End Sidorsky This tone entirely fit its time, when the death of Queen Victoria had led many in Britain to think a new, more progressive age was dawning.
On the normative side, views close to its ideal consequentialism remained prominent and even dominant, at least in Britain, until the s, though it is hard to know how far this is attributable to Moore himself since similar views had been widely accepted before him. In metaethics his non-naturalism likewise remained dominant for several decades, though here Moore played a larger role, especially for later writers, in part because of his general philosophical eminence and in part because of the vigor with which he presented the view.
By talking explicitly of non-natural properties he at least seemed to give non-naturalism a more robust metaphysical side than predecessors such as Sidgwick had, and he defended the view more emphatically, in particular by putting more weight on the open-question argument. By so emphasizing the two elements of non-naturalism — its realism and its commitment to the autonomy of ethics — Moore helped initiate a sequence of developments in 20 th -century metaethics.
The first reaction to non-naturalism, other than simple acceptance, came from philosophers who endorsed the autonomy of ethics but, sometimes under the influence of logical positivism, rejected its moral realism, holding instead that there are no facts other than natural ones and no modes of knowing other than the empirical and the strictly logical. They therefore developed various versions of non-cognitivism, which hold that moral judgements are not true or false but express attitudes, as in emotivism Ayer ; Stevenson , or issue something like imperatives, as in prescriptivism Hare ; Hare Unlike the subjective naturalism Moore criticized in Ethics , these views allow moral disagreement, since attitudes and imperatives can oppose each other, for example positive versus negative.
They also, their later proponents held, give a better explanation of the open-question argument, since they find a distinctive emotive or action-guiding force in moral concepts and judgements that is not present in non-moral ones; that is why, it was said, the moral is neither reducible to nor derivable from the non-moral.
Non-cognitivism can also explain, some said, why morality matters to us as it does. Non-naturalism implies that moral judgements concern a mysterious type of property, but why should facts about that property be important to us or influence our behavior? If moral judgements express deep-seated attitudes, however, the question answers itself.
0コメント